Facility location with double-peaked preference by Filos-Ratsikas, Aris et al.
Facility Location with Double-peaked Preferences∗
Aris Filos-Ratsikas†, Minming Li§, Jie Zhang?, and Qiang Zhang‡
†Department of Computer Science, Aarhus University, Denmark.
§Department of Computer Science, City University of Hong Kong, HK.
?Department of Computer Science, University of Oxford, UK.
‡Institute of Informatics, University of Warsaw, Poland.
Abstract
We study the problem of locating a single facility on a real line based on the reports of self-
interested agents, when agents have double-peaked preferences, with the peaks being on opposite
sides of their locations. We observe that double-peaked preferences capture real-life scenarios
and thus complement the well-studied notion of single-peaked preferences. We mainly focus
on the case where peaks are equidistant from the agents’ locations and discuss how our results
extend to more general settings. We show that most of the results for single-peaked preferences
do not directly apply to this setting; this makes the problem essentially more challenging. As
our main contribution, we present a simple truthful-in-expectation mechanism that achieves an
approximation ratio of 1+b/c for both the social and the maximum cost, where b is the distance
of the agent from the peak and c is the minimum cost of an agent. For the latter case, we provide
a 3/2 lower bound on the approximation ratio of any truthful-in-expectation mechanism. We
also study deterministic mechanisms under some natural conditions, proving lower bounds and
approximation guarantees. We prove that among a large class of reasonable mechanisms, there
is no deterministic mechanism that outperforms our truthful-in-expectation mechanism.
1 Introduction
We study the problem of locating a single facility on a real line, based on the input provided by
selfish agents who wish to minimize their costs. Each agent has a location xi ∈ R which is her
private information and is asked to report it to some central authority, which then decides where to
locate the facility, aiming to optimize some function of the agents’ reported locations. This model
corresponds to problems such as finding the ideal location for building a primary school or a bus
stop along a street, so that the total distance of all agents’ houses from the location is minimized,
or so that no agent’s house will lie too far away from that location.
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In our setting, we assume that agents have double-peaked preferences, i.e. we assume that
each agent i has two unique most preferred points or peaks, located at some distances from xi on
opposite sides, where her cost is minimum. Traditionally, preferences in facility location problems
are assumed to be single-peaked, i.e. each agent’s location is her most preferred point on the line
and her cost increases linearly (at the same rate) to the left and the right of that peak. Sometimes
however, single-peaked preferences do not model real-life scenarios accurately. Take for instance
the example mentioned above, where the government plans to build a primary school on a street.
An agent with single-peaked preferences would definitely want the school built next to her house,
so that she wouldn’t have to drive her children there everyday. However, it is quite possible that
she is also not very keen on the inevitable drawbacks of having a primary school next to her house
either, like unpleasant noise or trouble with parking. On the other hand, a five-minute walking
distance is sufficiently far for those problems to no longer be a factor but also sufficiently close for
her children to be able to walk to school. There are two such positions, (symmetrically) in each
direction, and those would be her two peaks.
Our primary objective is to explore double-peaked preferences in facility location settings similar
to the ones studied extensively for single-peaked preferences throughout the years [18, 20, 16, 15,
1, 12, 9, 13, 6, 11]. For that reason, following the literature we assume that the cost functions
are the same for all agents and that the cost increases linearly, at the same rate, as the output
moves away from the peaks. The straightforward extension to the double-peaked case is piecewise-
linear cost functions, with the same slope in all intervals, which gives rise to the natural model
of symmetric agents, i.e. the peaks are equidistant from the agent’s location. Note that this
symmetry is completely analogous to the single-peaked case (for facility location problems, e.g. see
[18]), where agents have exactly the same cost on two points equidistant from their peaks. Our
lower bounds and impossibility results naturally extend to non-symmetric settings, but some of our
mechanisms do not. We discuss those extensions in Section 5.
Our model also applies to more general spaces, beyond the real line. One can imagine for
instance that the goal is to build a facility on the plane where for the same reasons, agents would
like the facility to be built at some distance from their location, in every direction. This translates
to an agent having infinitely many peaks, located on a circle centered around her location. In that
case of course, we would no longer refer to agents’ preferences as double-peaked but the underyling
idea is similar to the one presented in this paper. We do not explore such extensions here; we leave
that for future work.
Agents are self-interested entities that wish to minimize their costs. We are interested in mech-
anisms that ensure that agents are not incentivized to report anything but their actual locations,
namely strategyproof mechanisms. We are also interested in group strategyproof mechanisms, i.e.,
mechanisms that are resistant to manipulation by coalitions of agents. Moreover, we want those
mechanisms to achieve some good performance guarantees, with respect to our goals. If our ob-
jective is to minimize the sum of the agent’s costs, known as the social cost, then we are looking
for strategyproof mechanisms that achieve a social cost as close as possible to that of the opti-
mal mechanism, which need not be strategyproof. The prominent measure of performance for
mechanisms in computer science literature is the approximation ratio [7, 14, 2, 4], i.e., the worst
possible ratio of the social cost achieved by the mechanism over the minimum social cost over
all instances of the problem. The same holds if our objective is to minimize the maximum cost
of any agent. In the case of randomized mechanisms, i.e., mechanisms that output a probability
distribution over points in R, instead of a single point, as a weaker strategyproofness constraint,
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we require truthfulness-in-expectation, i.e., a guarantee that no agent can reduce her expected cost
from misreporting.
1.1 Double-peaked preferences in practice
Single-peaked preferences were introduced in [3] as a way to avoid Condorcet cycles in majority
elections. Moulin [17] characterized the class of strategyproof mechanisms in this setting, proving
that median voter schemes are essentially the only strategyproof mechanisms for agents with single-
peaked preferences. Double-peaked preferences have been mentioned in social choice literature (e.g.
see [5]), to describe settings where preferences are not single-peaked, voting cycles do exist and
majority elections are not possible. In broader social choice settings, they can be used to model
situations where e.g. a left-wing party might prefer a more conservative but quite effective policy
to a more liberal but ineffective one on a left-to-right political axis. In fact, Egan [8] provides a
detailed discussion on double-peaked preferences in political decisions. He uses a 1964-1970 survey
about which course of action the United States should take with regard to the Vietnam war as
an example where the status quo (keep U.S, troops in Vietnam but try to terminate the war) was
ranked last by a considerable fraction of the population when compared to a left-wing policy (pull
out entirely) or a right-wing policy (take a stronger stand). This demonstrates that in a scenario
where the standard approach would be to assume that preferences are single-peaked, preferences can
instead be double-peaked. Egan provides additional evidence for the occurence of double-peaked
preferences supported by experimental results based on surveys on the U.S. population, for many
different problems (education, health care, illegal immigration treatment, foreign oil treatment
e.t.c.). More examples of double-peaked preferences in real-life scenarios are presented in [19].
The related work demonstrates that although they might not be as popular as their single-peaked
counterpart, double-peaked preferences do have applications in settings more general than the street
example described earlier. On the other hand, the primary focus of this paper is to study double-
peaked preferences on facility location settings and therefore the modelling assumptions follow the
ones of the facility location literature.
1.2 Our results
Our main contribution is a truthful-in-expectation mechanism (M1) that achieves an approximation
ratio of 1+b/c for the social cost and max{1+b/c, 2} for the maximum cost, where b is the distance
between an agent’s location and her peak and c is her minimum cost. We also prove that no truthful-
in-expectation mechanism can do better than a 3/2 approximation for the maximum cost proving
that at least for the natural special case where b = c, Mechanism M1 is not far from the best
possible. For deterministic mechanisms, we prove that no mechanism in a wide natural class of
strategyproof mechanisms can achieve an approximation ratio better than 1 + b/c for the social
cost and 1 + 2b/c for the maximum cost and hence cannot outperform Mechanism M1. To prove
this, we first characterize the class of strategyproof, anonymous and position invariant mechanisms
for two agents by a single mechanism (M2). Intuitively, anonymity requires that all agents are
handled equally by the mechanism while position invariance essentially requires that if we shift an
instance by a constant, the location of the facility should be shifted by the same constant as well.
This is a quite natural condition and can be interpreted as a guarantee that the facility will be
located relatively to the reports of the agents and independently of the underlying network (e.g.
the street).
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We prove that the approximation ratio of Mechanism M2 for the social cost is Θ(n), where n
is the number of agents and conjecture that no deterministic strategyproof mechanism can achieve
a constant approximation ratio in this case. For the maximum cost, the ratio of Mechanism M2
is max{1 + 2b/c, 3} which means that the mechanism is actually the best in the natural class of
anonymous and position invariant mechanisms. For any deterministic strategyproof mechanism,
we prove a lower bound of 2 on the approximation ratio, proving that at least for the natural case
of b = c, Mechanism M2 is also not far from optimal. Finally, we prove an impossibility result;
there is no group strategyproof, anonymous and position invariant mechanism for the problem.
This is in constrast with the single-peaked preference setting, where there is a large class of group
strategyproof mechanisms that satisfy those properties. Our results are summarized in Table 1.
2 Preliminaries
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be a set of agents. We consider the case where agents are located on a line,
i.e., each agent i ∈ N has a location xi ∈ R. We will occasionally use xi to refer to both the position
of agent i and the agent herself. We will call the collection x = 〈x1, . . . , xn〉 a location profile or an
instance.
A deterministic mechanism is a function f : Rn 7→ R that maps a given location profile to
a point in R, the location of the facility. We assume that agents have double-peaked preferences,
symmetric with respect to the origin. We discuss how our results extend to non-symmetric agents
in Section 5. Given any instance x and a location y ∈ R, the cost of agent i is
cost(y, xi) =
{
c+ |xi − b− y| if y ≤ xi
c+ |xi + b− y| if y > xi
where c and b are positive constants. We will say that y admits a cost of cost(y, xi) for agent i on
instance x. For a mechanism that outputs f(x) on instance x, the cost of agent i is cost(f(x), xi).
Intuitively, each agent has two most favorable locations, i.e., xi − b and xi + b, which we refer to
as the peaks of agent i. Note that these peaks are actually the troughs of the curve of the cost
function, but much like most related work, we refer to them as peaks. The parameter c > 0 is the
minimum cost incurred to an agent when the facility is built on one of her peaks.1 Note that the
special case, where b = c corresponds to the natural setting where the incurred minimum cost of
an agent is interpreted as the distance she needs to cover to actually reach the facility. This case
is particularly appealing, since the bounds we obtain are clean numbers, independent of b and c.
The bounds for the natural case can be obtained directly by letting b = c in all of our results.
A randomized mechanism is a function f : Rn 7→ ∆(R), where ∆(R) is the set of probability
distributions over R. It maps a given location profile to probabilistically selected locations of the
facility. The expected cost of agent i is Ey∼D [cost(y, xi)], where D is the probability distribution
of the mechanism outputs.
We will call a deterministic mechanism f strategyproof if no agent would benefit by misre-
porting her location, regardless of the locations of the other agents. This means that for ev-
ery x ∈ Rn, every i ∈ N and every x′i ∈ R, cost(f(x), xi) ≤ cost(f(x′i,x−i), xi), where x−i =
〈x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xn〉. A mechanism is truthful-in-expectation if it guarantees that every agent
1It is not hard to see by our results that if we let an agent’s cost be zero on her peaks, then in very general settings,
no determnistic strategyproof mechanism can guarantee a finite approximation ratio.
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always minimizes her expected cost by reporting her location truthfully. Throughout the paper
we will use the term strategyproofness when refering to deterministic mechanisms and the term
truthfulness when refering to randomized mechanisms.
A mechanism is group strategyproof if there is no coalition of agents, who by jointly misreporting
their locations, affect the outcome in a way such that the cost of none of them increases and the
cost of at least one of them strictly decreases. In other words, there is no S ⊆ N such that for
some misreports x′S of agents in S and some reports x−S of agents in N\S, cost(f(x′S ,x−S), xi) ≤
cost(f(x), xi) for all i ∈ S, and cost(f(x′S ,x−S), xj) < cost(f(x), xj) for at least one j ∈ S.
Given an instance x and a location y ∈ R, the social cost and the maximum cost of y are defined
respectively as:
SCy(x) =
n∑
i=1
cost(y, xi) , MCy(x) = max
i∈N
cost(y, xi).
We will say that y admits a social cost of SCy(x) or a maximum cost of MCy(x). We will
call y ∈ R an optimal location (for the social cost), if y ∈ arg miny SCy(x). The definition for the
maximum cost is analogous. Let SCopt(x) and MCopt(x) denote the social cost and the maximum
cost of an optimal location respectively, on instance x. For a mechanism f that outputs f(x) on
instance x, we will call SCf(x)(x) the social cost of the mechanism and we will denote it by SCf(x);
and analogously for the maximum cost.
We are interested in strategyproof mechanisms that perform well with respect to the goal
of minimizing either the social cost or the maximum cost. We measure the performance of the
mechanism by comparing the social/maximum cost it achieves with the optimal social/maximum
cost, on any instance x.
The approximation ratio of mechanism f , with respect to the social cost, is given by
r = sup
x
SCf(x)
SCopt(x)
.
The approximation ratio of mechanism f , with respect to maximum cost, is defined similarly.
For randomized mechanisms, the definitions are similar and the approximation ratio is calculated
with respect to the expected social or maximum cost, i.e., the expected sum of costs of all agents
and expected maximum cost of any agent, respectively.
Finally we consider some properties which are quite natural and are satisfied by many mech-
anisms (including the optimal mechanism). A mechanism f is anonymous, if for every location
profile x and every permutation pi of the agents, f(x1, . . . , xn) = f(xpi(1), . . . , xpi(n)). We say that a
mechanism f is onto, if for every point y ∈ R on the line, there exists a location profile x such that
f(x) = y. Without loss of generality, for anonymous mechanisms, we can assume x1 ≤ · · · ≤ xn.
A property that requires special mention is that of position invariance, which is a very natural
property as discussed in the introduction. This property was independently defined by [10] where
it was referred to as shift invariance. One can view position invariance as an analogue to neutrality
in problems like the one studied here, where there is a continuum of outcomes instead of a finite
set.
Definition 1. A mechanism f satisfies position invariance, if for all location profiles x = 〈x1, ..., xn〉
and t ∈ R, it holds f(x1+t, x2+t, . . . , xn+t) = f(x)+t. In this case, we will call such a mechanism
position invariant. We will refer to instances x and 〈x1+t, x2+t, . . . , xn+t〉 as position equivalent.
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Note that position invariance implies the onto condition. Indeed, for any location profile x,
with f(x) = y, we have f(x1 + t, x2 + t, . . . , xn + t) = y
′ = y+ t for any t ∈ R, so every point y′ ∈ R
is a potential output of the mechanism.
3 A truthful-in-expectation mechanism
We start the exposition of our results with our main contribution, a truthful-in-expectation mech-
anism that achieves an approximation ratio of 1 + b/c for the social cost and max{1 + b/c, 2} for
the maximum cost.
Mechanism M1. Given any instance x = 〈x1, ..., xn〉, find the median agent xm = median(x1, ..., xn),
breaking ties in favor of the agent with the smallest index. Output f(x) = xm − b with probability
1
2 and f(x) = xm + b with probability
1
2 .
Theorem 1. Mechanism M1 is truthful-in-expectation.
Proof. First, note that the median agent does not have an incentive to deviate, since her expected
cost is already minimum, neither does any agent i for which xi = xm. Hence, for the deviating
agent i it must be either xi < xm or xi > xm. We consider three cases when xi < xm. The proof
for the case xi > xm is symmetric. Observe that for agent i to be able to move the position of the
facility, she has to report x′i ≥ xm and change the identity of the median agent. Let x′m be the
median agent in the new instance 〈x′i, x−i〉, after agent i’s deviation. If x′m = xm, then obviously
agent xi does not gain from deviating, so we will assume that x
′
m > xm.
Case 1: xi + b ≤ xm − b (symmetrically xi − b ≥ xm + b).
In this case, the cost of agent i is calculated with respect to xi + b for both possible outcomes
of the mechanism. Since x′m− b > xm− b and x′m + b > xm + b, it holds that |(xi + b)− (x′m− b)| >
|(xi + b)− (xm − b)| and |(xi + b)− (x′m + b|) > |(xi + b)− (xm + b)| and agent i can not gain from
misreporting.
Case 2: xm − b < xi + b ≤ xm (symmetrically xm ≤ xi − b < xm + b).
Again, the cost of agent i is calculated with respect to xi+b for both outcomes of the mechanism.
This time, it might be that |(xi+b)−(x′m−b)| < |(xi+b)−(xm−b)| but since (x′m−b)−(xm−b) =
(x′m + b) − (xm + b), it will also hold that |(xi + b) − (x′m + b)| > |(xi + b) − (xm + b)| and also
|(xi + b)− (xm − b)| − |(xi + b)− (x′m − b)| = |(xi + b)− (x′m + b)| − |(xi + b)− (xm + b)|. Hence,
the expected cost of agent i after misreporting is at least as much as it was before.
Case 3: xm < xi + b ≤ xm + b (symmetrically xm − b ≤ xi − b < xm).
The cost of agent i before misreporting is calculated with respect to xi− b when the outcome is
xm− b and with respect to xi+ b when the outcome is xm+ b. For any misreport x′i < xi+ b, this is
still the case (for x′m−b and x′m+b respectively) and since (x′m−b)−(xm−b) = (x′m+b)−(xm+b),
her expected cost is not smaller than before. For any misreport x′i > xi + b, her cost is calculated
with respect to xi + b for both possible outcomes of the mechanism and for the same reason as in
Case 2, her expected cost is at least as much as it was before misreporting.
3.1 Social cost
Next, we will calculate the approximation ratio of the mechanism for the social cost. In order to
do that, we will need the following lemma.
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Lemma 1. Let x = 〈x1, ..., xm, ..., xn〉, where xm = median (x1, ..., xn), breaking ties in favor of
the smallest index. There exists an optimal location for the social cost in [xm − b, xm + b].
Proof. Assume for contradiction that this is not the case. Then, for any optimal location y, it must
be that either y < xm − b or y > xm + b.
Assume first that y < xm − b. Since xm is the median agent, it holds that for at least dn/2e
agents, xi−b ≥ xm−b, that is xm−b admits a smaller cost for at least dn/2e agents when compared
to y. Let X1 be the set of those agents. On the other hand, for each agent xi < xm, xm − b may
admit a smaller or larger cost than y, depending on her position with respect to y. In the worst
case, the cost is larger for every one of those agents, which happens when xi+ b ≤ y for every agent
with xi < xm. Let X2 be the set of those agents. Now observe that for any two agents xa ∈ X1 and
xb ∈ X2, it holds that cost(xa, y)−cost(xa, xm−b) = cost(xb, xm−b)−cost(xb, y). Since |X1| ≥ |X2|,
it holds that that SCxm−b(x) ≤ SCy(x). Since it can not be that SCxm−b(x) < SCy(x), xm − b is
an optimal location and we get a contradiction.
Now assume y > xm + b. Let y = xm + b. If the number of agents is odd, then we can use an
exactly symmetric argument to prove that SCxm+b ≤ SCy. If the number of agents is even, the
argument can still be used, since our tie-breaking rule selects agent xn/2 as the median. Specifically,
xm + b admits a smaller cost for exactly n/2 of the agents (including agent xn/2) and in the worst
case, y admits a smaller cost for n/2 agents as well. If X1 and X2 are the sets of those agents
respectively, then again it holds that cost(xa, y)− cost(xa, xm + b) = cost(xb, xm + b)− cost(xb, y)
for xa ∈ X1 and xb ∈ X2 and we get a contradiction as before.
We now proceed to proving the approximation ratio of Mechanism M1.
Theorem 2. Mechanism M1 has an approximation ratio of 1 + bc for the social cost.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary instance x = 〈x1, ..., xn〉 and let xm be the median agent. By Lemma
1, there exists an optimal location y ∈ [xm − b, xm + b]. Let δ = y − (xm − b). For every
agent i, it holds that cost(xi, xm − b) ≤ cost(xi, y) + δ. To see this, first observe that |(xi −
b) − (xm − b)| ≤ |(xi − b) − y| + δ and that |(xi + b) − (xm − b)| ≤ |(xi + b) − y| + δ. If the
cost of an agent admitted by y and xm − b is calculated with respect to the same peak, then
min(|(xi − b) − (xm − b)|, |(xi + b) − (xm − b)|) ≤ min(|(xi − b) − y|, |(xi + b) − y|) + δ and the
inequality holds. If the cost is calculated with respect to different peaks for y and xm − b, it must
be that cost(xi, xm − b) = c + |(xi − b) − (xm − b)| and cost(xi, y) = c + |xi + b − y|, because
xm−b < y. Since |(xi−b)−(xm−b)| ≤ |(xi+b)−(xm−b)| ≤ |(xi+b)−y|+δ, the inequality holds.
Similarily, we can prove that cost(xi, xm + b) ≤ cost(xi, y) + (2b− δ) for every agent i. Hence, we
can upper bound the cost of Mechanism M1 by 12
∑n
i=1 cost(xi, xm − b)+ 12
∑n
i=1 cost(xi, xm + b)
≤ 12
∑n
i=1 (cost(xi, y) + δ) +
1
2
∑n
i=1 (cost(xi, y) + 2b− δ) = SCy(x) + nb = SCopt(x) + nb. The
approximation ratio then becomes 1 + nbSCopt(x) , which is at most 1 +
b
c , since SCopt(x) is at least
nc.
For the lower bound, consider the location profile x = 〈x1, ..., xn〉 with x1 = ... = xk−1 = xk−b =
xk+1 − 2b = ... = xn − 2b. Note that the argument works both when n = 2k and when n = 2k + 1
because Mechanism M1 selects agent xk as the median agent in each case. The optimal location
is x1 + c whereas Mechanism M1 equiprobably outputs fM1(x) = xk − b or fM1(x) = xk + b. The
cost of the optimal location is SCopt(x) = nc+ b whereas the cost of Mechanism M1 is SCM1(x) =
nc+(1/2)(n−1)b +(1/2)(n−1)b = nc+(n−1)b. The approximation ratio then becomes nc+(n−1)bnc+b
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= 1 bc · n−2n+(b/c) . As the number of agents grows to infinity, the approximation ratio of the mechanism
on this instance approaches 1 + b/c. This completes the proof.
3.2 Maximum cost
We also consider the maximum cost and prove the approximation ratio of Mechanism M1 as well as
a lower bound on the approximation ratio of any truthful-in-expectation mechanism. The results
are summarized in Table 1.
Theorem 3. Mechanism M1 has an approximation ratio of max{1+b/c, 2} for the maximum cost.
Proof. Let x = 〈x1, ..., xn〉 be an arbitrary instance and let xm be the median agent. We will con-
sider two cases, based on the location of fopt(x) with respect to xm − b (or symmetrically xm + b).
Case 1: fopt(x) < xm − b (or fopt(x) > xm + b).
Let δ = (xm − b) − fopt(x). For the same reason as in the proof of Theorem 2, for every
agent i, it holds that cost(xi, xm − b) ≤ cost(xi, fopt(x)) + δ and also that cost(xi, xm + b) ≤
cost(xi, fopt(x)) + (2b+ δ).
The maximum cost of Mechanism M1 is
MCM1(x) =
1
2
max
i∈N
cost(xi, xm − b) + 1
2
max
i∈N
cost(xi, xm + b)
≤ 1
2
(
max
i∈N
cost(xi, fopt(x)) + δ
)
+
1
2
(
max
i∈N
cost(xi, fopt(x)) + (2b+ δ)
)
= MCopt(x) + b+ δ ≤ 2MCopt(x) + b− c
since MCopt(x) ≥ c+ δ. The approximation is at most 2 + b−cMCopt(x) , which is at most 1 + bc if b ≥ c
(since MCopt(x) ≥ c) and at most 2 if b < c (since MCopt(x) > 0).
Case 2: xm − c ≤ fopt(x) ≤ xm + b.
Now, let δ = fopt(x)− (xm− b). Again, it holds that cost(xi, xm− b) ≤ cost(xi, fopt(x)) + δ and
also that cost(xi, xm + b) ≤ cost(xi, fopt(x)) + (2b− δ).
The maximum cost of Mechanism M1 is
MCM1(x) =
1
2
max
i∈N
cost(xi, xm − b) + 1
2
max
i∈N
cost(xi, xm + b)
≤ 1
2
(
max
i∈N
cost(xi, fopt(x)) + δ
)
+
1
2
(
max
i∈N
cost(xi, fopt(x)) + (2b− δ)
)
= MCopt(x) + b
and the approximation ratio is at most 1 + bc (since MCopt(x) ≥ c).
For the matching lower bound, consider an instance x = 〈x1, ..., xn〉 on which x1 + b < x2 − b
and xi = x2 for all i /∈ {1, 2}. It is fopt(x) = x1+x22 , i.e. the middle of the interval between x1 and
x2, whereas Mechanism M1 selects equiprobably among x2−b and x2+b. Let d = fopt(x)−(x1+b).
Then MCopt(x) = c+d, whereas MCM1(x) = c+
1
22d+
1
2(2d+2b) = b+c+2d. The approximation
ratio is 1 + b+dc+d which is 1 +
b
c as d goes to 0 and 2 as d goes to infinity. 
Next, we provide a lower bound on the approximation ratio of any truthful-in-expectation
mechanism.
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Theorem 4. Any truthful-in-expectation mechanism has an approximation ratio of at least 32 for
the maximum cost.
First, we state a couple of lemmas which are in essence very similar to those used in the proof of
the single-peaked preferences case in [18]. Let x = 〈x1, x2〉 be an instance such that x1 + b < x2− b
and let λ = (x2 − b) − (x1 + b). Let f be a truthful-in-expectation mechanism and let D be the
distribution that y = f(x) follows on instance x.
Lemma 2. On instance x, at least one of Ey∼D [cost(x1, y)] ≥ c+ λ2 and
Ey∼D [cost(x2, y)] ≥ c+ λ2 holds.
Proof. Obviously, cost(x1, y)+cost(x2, y) ≥ 2c+λ for any choice of y, hence Ey∼D
[∑2
i=1 cost(xi, y)
]
=∑2
i=1 Ey∼D[cost(xi, y)] ≥ 2c + λ. Therefore, it must be that Ey∼D[cost(xi, y)] ≥ c + λ2 for at least
one of i = 1 or i = 2.
Lemma 3. Let fopt(x) be the outcome of the optimal mechanism on instance x. If Ey∼D[|y −
fopt(x)|] = ∆, then the maximum cost of the mechanism on this instance is E[MCf (x)] = c+ λ2 +∆.
Proof. Since ∀y, MCf (x) = c+ |y − fopt(x)|+ λ/2, it holds
Ey∼D[MCf (x)] = Ey∼D[c+
λ
2
+ |y − fopt(x)|] = c+ λ
2
+ Ey∼D[|y − fopt(x)|] = c+ λ
2
+ ∆.

We can now prove the theorem.
Proof. Consider an instance with two agents on which x1 + b < x2 − b and (x2 − b)− (x1 + b) = λ.
It holds that fopt(x) =
x1+x2
2 . Assume there is a truthful-in-expectation mechanism M on which
y = f(x1, x2) follows a distribution D on this instance. According to Lemma 2, at least one of
Ey∼D[cost(y, x1)] ≥ c + λ/2 and Ey∼D[cost(y, x2)] ≥ c + λ/2 holds. W.l.o.g., assume the second
inequality is true (if the first inequality is true then we can make a symmetric argument with agent
x1 deviating).
Next, consider the instance x′ = 〈x′1, x′2〉 with x′1 = x1 and x′2 = x2 + λ. Let fopt(x′) =
(x′1 + x′2)/2 = x2 − b. Let D′ be the distribution that y′ follows on instance x′. By strategyproof-
ness, Ey′∼D′ [cost(y′, x2)] ≥ Ey∼D[cost(y, x2)] ≥ c+λ/2, since x′2 could be a deviation of agent 2 on
instance x. This implies Ey′∼D′ [|y′ − (x2 − b)|] ≥ λ2 . To see this, assume otherwise for contradic-
tion, we would have
Ey′∼D′
[
cost(y′, x2)
]
= Ey′∼D′
[
c+ min{|y′ − (x2 − b)|, |y′ − (x2 + b)|}
]
≤ c+ min{Ey′∼D′ [|y′ − (x2 − b)|] ,Ey′∼D′ [|y′ − (x2 + b)|]}
< c+
λ
2
.
Equivalently, we have Ey′∼D′ [|y′ − fopt(x′)|] ≥ λ2 . Hence, by applying Lemma 3, we know that
the maximum cost of the mechanism on the second instance is Ey′∼D′ [MCM (x′)] ≥ c + λ + λ2 =
c + 3λ2 . Since the optimal mechanism locates the facility on fopt(x
′), its maximum cost is c + λ.
Therefore, the approximation ratio is at least c+3λ/2c+λ . As λ grows to infinity, the approximation
ratio approaches 32 . To generalize the proof to more than two agents, place every other agent on
fopt(x)+b on instance x. Since λ is large enough, the maximum cost is still calculated with respect
to x2 and all the arguments still hold. 
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Table 1: Summary of our results. The lower bounds for deterministic mechanisms hold for anony-
mous and position invariant strategyproof mechanisms. For (∗), an additional lower bound of 2
holds under no conditions. Fields indicated by (-) are not proven yet. For the maximum cost, the
approximation ratios are actually max{1 + 2b/c, 3} and max{1 + b/c, 2} respectively. The results
for single-peaked preferences are also noted for comparison.
Double-peaked Single-peaked
Ratio Lower Ratio Lower
Social cost
Deterministic Θ(n) 1 + bc 1 1
Randomized 1 + bc - 1 1
Maximum cost
Deterministic∗ 1 + 2bc 1 +
2b
c 2 2
Randomized 1 + bc 3/2 3/2 3/2
4 Deterministic Mechanisms
We now turn our attention to deterministic mechanisms. We will start by stating and proving the
following lemma, which will be very useful throughout the paper. Variations of the instances used
here will appear in several of our proofs.
When n = 2, we call the following instance2 the primary instance.
Primary instance: x = 〈x1, x2〉 with x1 + 2b +  = x2 − b, where  is an arbitrarily small
positive quantity.
Lemma 4. On the primary instance, there is no anonymous, position invariant and strategyproof
mechanism such that f(x) ∈ [x1 + b, x2 − b].
Proof. For contradiction, suppose there exists an anonymous, position invariant strategyproof
mechanism M that ouputs f(x) ∈ [x1 + b, x2 − b]. Let’s denote δ1 = f(x) − (x1 + b), δ2 =
(x2−b)−f(x). Throughout the proof we start with the primary instance and construct some other
instances to prove the lemma. There are 2 cases to be considered.
Case 1: 0 < δ1 ≤ 12(b + ), i.e., x1 + b < f(x) ≤ x1+x22 (symmetrically, for the case 0 < δ2 ≤
1
2(b+ )). See Figure 1.
• Instance I : xI = 〈xI1, xI2〉, where xI1 = x1 + δ1, xI2 = x2.
• Instance II : xII = 〈xII1 , xII2 〉, where xII1 = x1 + δ1, xII2 = x2 + δ1.
2We note that this is actually a family of different instances, for each possible value of x1 on the real line. Any
one of those instances can be used for our purposes and hence we use the term loosely.
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Figure 1: Case 1 of Lemma 4. On instance I, agent xI2 can report x
II
2 and decrease her cost.
Instances II and the Primary instance are position equivalent.
Figure 2: Case 2(a) and 2(b) of Lemma 4. If f(xIII1 , x
III
2 ) = x
III
1 − b on instance III, agent xIII2 can
misreport xIVa2 and decrease her cost, since instances IVa and the Primary instance are position
equivalent. If f(xIII1 , x
III
2 ) = x
III
1 + b on instance III, then on the Primary instance, agent x2 can
misreport xIVb2 and decrease her cost. By anonymity, instances III and IVb are position equivalent.
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First, we know that on instance I, strategyproofness requires that f(xI) = xI1−b or xI1+b, other-
wise agent xI1 could misreport x1 and move the facility to position x
I
1 + b, minimizing her cost. Sec-
ond, since instance II and the primary instance are position equivalent (II is a shifted version of the
primary instance to the right by δ1), by position invariance we know f(x
II) = xII1 +b+δ1 = x
I
1+b+δ1.
Now let’s consider agent xI2 in instance I. If agent x
I
2 misreports x
II
2 , she can move the facility from
xI1− b or xI1 + b to xI1 + b+ δ1 ≤ xI2− b; in either case the facility is closer to her left peak. Therefore
xI2 can manipulate the mechanism, which violates strategyproofness. Hence f(x) 6∈ (x1 + b, x1+x22 ].
Case 2: δ1 = 0, i.e., f(x) = x1 + b (symmetrically, for the case δ2 = 0). See Figure 2.
• Instance III : xIII = 〈xIII1 , xIII2 〉, where xIII1 = x1 + 2b, xIII2 = x2.
First, we know that on instance III, strategyproofness requires that f(xIII) = xIII1 − b or xIII1 + b,
otherwise agent xIII1 could misreport x1 and move the facility to position x
III
1 − b, minimizing her
cost. Now, there are two subcases.
(a) f(xIII) = xIII1 − b. See left hand side of Figure 2, where we have instance IVa: xIVa1 = x1 +
2b, xIVa2 = x2 + 2b.
Obviously, instance IVa is position equivalent to the primary instance, so f(xIVa1 , x
IVa
2 ) =
xIVa1 + b. Note that the cost of agent x
III
2 is b + c + . If agent x
III
2 misreports x
IVa
2 , then
her cost becomes b+c−, which is smaller than when reporting truthfully. So f(xIII) 6= xIII1 −b
if Mechanism M is strategyproof.
(b) f(xIII) = xIII1 + b. See right hand side of Figure 2, where we have instance IVb: x
IVb
1 =
xIII1 , x
IVb
2 = x
III
1 − (b+ ).
Obviously, instance IVb is position equivalent to instance III, so f(xIVb1 , x
IVb
2 ) = x
IVb
2 + b as
implied by position invariance and anonymity. Note that on instance III, the cost of agent xIII2
is b+ c− . If agent xIII2 misreports xIVb2 , then her cost becomes c+ 2, which is smaller than
when reporting truthfully (since  is arbitrarily small). So f(xIII) 6= xIII1 + b if Mechanism M
is strategyproof.
Hence, in order for mechanism M to be strategyproof, it must be f(x) 6= x1 + b.
In all, there is no anonymous, position invariant and strategyproof mechanism such that f(x) ∈
[x1 + b, x2 − b]. 
4.1 Group strategyproofness
As we mentioned in the introduction, under the reasonable conditions of position invariance and
anonymity, there is no group strategyproof mechanism for the problem. We will prove this claim
by using Lemma 4 and the following lemma.
When n = 2k + 1, k ∈ Z+, let P be the instance obtained by locating k + 1 agents on x1 and
k agents on x2 on the primary instance. Similarly, let S be the instance obtained by locating k
agents on x1 and k + 1 agents on x2 on the primary instance. Formally, let x
P = 〈xP1 , . . . , xPn 〉,
where xP1 = · · · = xPk+1, xPk+2 = · · · = xPn , and (xPn − b)− (xP1 + b) = b+  and xS = 〈xS1 , . . . , xSn〉,
where xS1 = · · · = xSk , xSk+1 = · · · = xSn , and (xSn− b)− (xS1 + b) = b+ , where  is the same quantity
as in the primary instance.
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Lemma 5. When n = 2k + 1, any position invariant and group strategyproof mechanism that
outputs f(xP) = xP1 + b on instance P, must output f(x) = x1 + b on any instance x = 〈x1, ..., xn〉,
where x1 = ... = xk+1, xk+2 = ... = xn and (xn − b) − (x1 + b) = 2b. Similarly, any position
invariant and group strategyproof mechanism that outputs f(xS) = xSn − b on instance S, must
output f(x) = xn − b on any instance x = 〈x1, ..., xn〉, where x1 = ... = xk, xk+1 = ... = xn and
(xn − b)− (x1 + b) = 2b.
Proof. We prove the first part of the lemma. The proof of the second part is symmetric. Note that
the difference between instances xP and x is that the distance between the two groups of agents is
b+ in xP while it is 2b in x. First, we argue that f(x) ∈ [x1+b, xn−b]. Indeed, if that was not the
case, if f(x) < x1 + b, by the onto condition implied by position invariance, all agents could jointly
misreport some different positions and move the facility to x1 + b. This point admits a smaller
cost for all agents; specifically the cost of agents x1, . . . , xk+1 is minimized while the cost of agents
xk+2, . . . , xn is reduced and group strategyproofness is violated. Using a symmetric argument, we
conclude that it can’t be f(x) > xn − b either.
Secondly, we argue that f(x) 6∈ (x1 + b, xn − b]. Indeed, assume that was not the case. Then
agents xPk+2, . . . , x
P
n on instance x
P could jointly misreport xk+2, . . . , xn and move the facility from
f(xP) = xP1 + b to f(x). Since by assumption f(x) ∈ (x1 + b, xn − b], the cost of each deviating
agent is smaller than her cost before deviating. Group strategyproofness is then violated and hence
it must be that f(x) = x1+b. By position invariance, it must be that f(x¯) = x¯1+b on any instance
x¯ which is position equivalent to instance x. 
Theorem 5. There is no group strategyproof mechanism that is anonymous and position invariant.
Proof. When n = 2, on the primary instance, according to Lemma 4, there is no anonymous,
position invariant and strategyproof mechanism such that f(x) ∈ [x1 + b, x2 − b]. In addition, if
the facility was placed on some point f(x) < x1 + b (the argument for f(x) > x2− b is symmetric),
for any mechanism that satisfies position invariance which implies onto, agents 1 and 2 could
jointly misreport some positions xˆ1 and xˆ2 such that f(xˆ1, xˆ2) = x1 + b. Obviously, this deviation
admits the minimum possible cost for agent 1 and a reduced cost for agent 2, violating group
strategyproofness.
The proof can easily be extended to the case when n is even. On the primary instance, simply
place n2 agents on x1 and
n
2 agents on x2. By considering deviations of coalitions of agents coinciding
on x1 or x2 instead of deviations of agents x1 and x2 respectively, all the arguments still hold.
However, additional care must be taken when n is odd.
When n = 2k+ 1, k ∈ Z+, we denote by PJ the instance after placing k+ 1 agents on xJ1 and k
agents on xJ2 on instance J, where J is either instance I, II, III, IVa or IVb of the proof of Lemma
4. Similarly, let SJ be the instance after placing k agents on x
J
1 and k+ 1 agents on x
J
2 on instance
J. Finally, let XK1 be the group of agents i for which x
K
i = x
K
1 on instance K, where K is either
P, PI, PII, PIII, PIVa, PIVb, S, SI, SII, SIII, SIVa or SIVb, and let X
K
2 be the group of agents i for which
xKi = x
K
n on instance K.
For contradiction, assume that there exists an anonymous, position invariant, and group strate-
gyproof mechanism. On instance P , by group strategyproofness, it must be f(xP) ∈ [xP1 +b, xPn −b]
and by the same arguments used in case 1 of Lemma 4 (with instances PI, PII instead of I, II and
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with XP1 and X
P
2 instead of x1 and x2)
3, it must be f(xP) /∈ (xP1 + b, xPn − b). Hence, it must be
that either f(xP) = xP1 + b or f(x
P) = xPn − b. Assume w.l.o.g. that f(xP) = xP1 + b; the other
case can be handled symmetrically.
Following the arguments of case 2 of Lemma 4 (using instance PIII instead of III), group strat-
egyproofness and position invariance imply that f(xPIII) = xPIII1 − b or f(xPIII) = xPIII1 + b on
instance PIII. By the arguments of subcase (a) (using instance PIVa instead of IVa), it can’t be that
f(xPIII) = xPIII1 − b, so it must be that f(xPIII) = xPIII1 + b. However, we can not simply apply the
argument used in subcase (b) to get a contradiction, because since there is a different number of
agents on xP1 and x
P
2 , instances P and PIVa are no longer position equivalent.
Next, consider instance S and observe that f(xS) /∈ (xS1 + b, xSn − b) by the same arguments as
above and f(xS) ∈ [xS1 + b, xSn − b] by group strategyproofness and position invariance. Hence it is
either f(xS) = xS1 +b or f(x
S) = xSn−b. Assume first that f(xS) = xS1 +b. By the same arguments
as above (using instances SIII and SIVa), on instance SIII, it must be that f(x
SIII) = xSIII1 + b.
Now, observe that if XPIII2 misreport x¯
PIII
i = x
PIII
i − 2b − 2, then we get instance PIVb which is
position equivalent to instance SIII and hence it must be that f(x
PIVb) = xPIVbn + b. The cost of
XPIII2 before misreporting was b + c −  while it becomes c + 2 after misreporting. This violates
strategyproofness, which means that on instance S, it must be f(xS) = xSn − b.
Let’s denote instance T by xT = 〈xT1 , ..., xTn 〉, where xT1 = ... = xTk = xTk+1 − 2b = xTk+2 − 4b =
... = xTn − 4b. Let XT1 be the set of agents i for which xTi = xT1 , and let XT2 be the set of agents j
for which xTj = x
T
n , and let xt be agent x
T
k+1. On instance T, it must be either f(x
T ) = xT1 + b or
f(xT ) = xTn − b, otherwise agent xt could misreport x′t = xT1 and then by Lemma 5 and the fact
that on instance P it is f(xP) = xP1 + b, it should be f(x
T
1 , ..., x
′
t, ..., x
T
n ) = xt − b, which admits a
cost of c for agent xt. Similarily, by Lemma 5 and the fact that on instance S, it is f(x
S) = xSn − b,
if agent xt misreports x
′′
t = x
T
n , then it should be f(x
T
1 , ..., x
′′
t , ..., x
T
n ) = xt + b. If f(x
T) = xTn − b,
agent xt could form a coalition with agents X
T
1 and by misreporting x
′
t, move the facility to xt− b,
a choice that would admit the same cost for her, but a strictly smaller cost for every other member
of the coalition. If f(xT) = xT1 + b then agent xt could form a coalition with agents X
T
2 and by
misreporting x′′t , move the facility to xt + b, a choice that would admit the same cost for her, but
a strictly smaller cost for every other member of the coalition. In each case, there is a coalition of
agents that can benefit from misreporting and group strategyproofness is violated. This completes
the proof. 
4.2 Strategyproofness
We now turn our attention to (simple) strategyproofness. It is well known [17] that when agents
have single-peaked preferences, outputing the location of the kth agent (kth order statistic), results
in a strategyproof mechanism. This is not the case however, for double-peaked preferences and any
choice of k.
Lemma 6. Given any instance x = 〈x1, ..., xn〉, any mechanism that outputs f(x) = xi − b, for
i = 2, ..., n or any mechanism that outputs f(x) = xi + b, for i = 1, ..., n− 1, is not strategyproof.
Proof. We prove the case when f(x) = x1 + b. The arguments for the other cases are similar.
Consider any instance where x2 = x1 + b and xi − b > x2 + b for i = 3, ..., n. Since f(x) =
3Here we assume for convenience that any mechanism outputs the same location in [xP1 + c, x
P
n − c] on the primary
instance and instance P . This is without loss of generality because the argument for any output in [xP1 + b, x
P
n − b]
is exactly the same.
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f(x1, x2, x3, ..., xn) = x1 + b, the cost of agent 2 is cost(f(x), x2) = b + c. If agent 2 misreports
x′2 = x1 − b, the outcome will be f(x′) = f(x1, x′2, x3, ..., xn) = x′2 + c = x1, and cost(f(x′), x2) =
c < b + c = cost(f(x), x2). Agent 2 has an incentive to misreport, therefore the mechanism is not
strategyproof. 
This only leaves two potential choices among kth order statistics, either f(x) = x1 − b or
f(x) = xn + b. Consider the following mechanism.
Mechanism M2. Given any instance x = 〈x1, ..., xn〉, locate the facility always on the left peak of
agent 1, i.e. f(x) = x1 − b or always on the right peak of agent n, i.e. f(x) = xn + b.
From now on, we will assume that M2 locates the facility on x1 − b on any instance x. The
analysis for the other case is similar.
Theorem 6. Mechanism M2 is strategyproof.
Proof. Obviously, agent 1 has no incentive to misreport, since her cost is already minimum. For
any other agent i, i = 2, . . . , n, the cost is cost(f(x), xi) = c+ xi − x1. For any misreport x′i ≥ x1,
the facility is still located on x1−b and every agent’s cost is the same as before. For some misreport
x′i < x1, the facility moves to f(x1, ..., x
′
i, ..., xn) = x
′
i − b < x1 − b, i.e. further away from any of
agent i’s peaks and hence this choice admits a larger cost for her. 
In the following, we prove that for the case of two agents, Mechanism M2 is actually the
only strategyproof mechanism that satisfies anonymity and position invariance. We start with the
following lemma.
Lemma 7. For any instance x = 〈x1, x2〉, where x1+b < x2−b, if an anonymous, position invariant
and strategyproof mechanism outputs f(x1, x2) = x1 − b, then it must output f(x′1, x′2) = x′1 − b for
any instance x′ = 〈x′1, x′2〉 with x′1 ≤ x′2.
Proof. Let (x2 − b) − (x1 + b) = γ. For any other instance x′ = 〈x′1, x′2〉 with x′1 ≤ x′2, we assume
x′1 = x1 without loss of generality due to position invariance. We will consider potential deviations
of agent 2 of instance x. Note that position invariance and anonymity suggest that we only need to
consider deviations x′2 ≥ x1 because any instance on which x′2 < x1 is position equivalent to some
instance 〈xˆ1, xˆ2〉 with xˆ1 = x1 and xˆ2 > x1.
On instance x, the cost of agent 2 is 2b+ c+ γ, so for any deviation of x2, her cost must be at
least 2b+ c+ γ, as required by strategyproofness. This implies that if agent 2 misreports x′2, then
on the resulting instance it must be either f(x1, x
′
2) ∈ (−∞, x1−b] or f(x1, x′2) ∈ [x2+3b+γ,+∞).
First, assume f(x1, x
′
2) ∈ [x2 + 3b+ γ,∞). Let instance I be xI = 〈xI1, xI2〉, where xI1 = x1, xI2 =
f(x1, x
′
2) + b. On instance I it must be either f(x
I
1, x
I
2) = f(x1, x
′
2) or f(x
I
1, x
I
2) = f(x1, x
′
2) + 2b,
otherwise agent 2 can deviate from xI2 to x
′
2 and move the facility to x
I
2−b, minimizing her cost and
violating strategyproofness. However then, on instance I, agent 1 can misreport x¯I1 = x
I
2 − 2b − γ
and move the facility to xI2−3b−γ, reducing her cost and violating strategyproofness. This follows
from the fact that the resulting instance 〈x¯I1, xI2〉 and instance x are position equivalent and that
f(x1, x2) = x1− b on instance x. Hence, it can not be that f(x1, x′2) ∈ [x2 + 3b+ γ,∞) on instance
x′.
Second, assume f(x1, x
′
2) ∈ (−∞, x1 − b). Then, since x′2 > x1, agent 2 can deviate from x′2
to x2 and move the facility to x1 − b, i.e. closer to her actual position. Hence, it can’t be that
f(x1, x
′
2) ∈ (−∞, x1 − b) on instance x′ either.
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In conclusion, it must be f(x1, x
′
2) = f(x
′
1, x
′
2) = x
′
1 − b for any instance x′ = (x′1, x′2) with
x′1 ≤ x′2.
Theorem 7. When n = 2, the only strategyproof mechanism that satisfies position invariance and
anonymity is Mechanism M2.
Proof. For contradiction, suppose there exists an anonymous, position invariant strategyproof
mechanism M which is different from Mechanism M2 and consider the primary instance used
in Lemma 4.
We first argue that it must be that f(x1, x2) ∈ [x1 + b, x2 − b]. Assume on the contrary that
f(x1, x2) < x1 + b (the argument for f(x1, x2) > x2 − b is symmetric). Then, consider the instance
〈x′1, x′2〉, where x′2 = x2 and x′1 = f(x1, x2)− b. On this instance, it must be that f(x′1, x′2) = x′1− b
or f(x′1, x′2) = x′1 + b, otherwise agent 1 can deviate from x′1 to x1 and move the facility to x′1 + b,
minimizing her cost. In addition, if f(x′1, x′2) = x′1 − b, then according to Lemma 7, the unique
strategyproof mechanism that satisfies position invariance and anonymity is Mechanism M2, and
thus our assumption is violated. So let’s assume f(x′1, x′2) = x′1+ b. Then, on the primary instance,
agent 2 could report xˆ2 = x2 + (x1 + b − f(x1, x2)) and by position invariance (since instances
〈x′1, x′2〉 and 〈x1, xˆ2〉 are position equivalent), it should be f(x1, xˆ2) = x1+b. This would give agent
2 an incentive to misreport, violating strategyproofness. Hence, on the primary instance it must
be that f(x1, x2) ∈ [x1 + b, x2 − b].
However, according to Lemma 4, it is impossible for a strategyproof mechanism to output
f(x1, x2) ∈ [x1 + b, x2 − b] on the primary instance. In conclusion, no mechanism other than
Mechanism M2 is strategyproof, anonymous and position invariant. 
4.3 Social Cost
We have seen that Mechanism M2 is strategyproof, but how well does it perform with respect to
our goals, namely minimizing the social cost or the maximum cost? In other words, what is the
approximation ratio that Mechanism M2 achieves against the optimal choice? First, we observe
that the optimal mechanism, which minimizes the social cost, is not strategyproof.
Theorem 8. The optimal mechanism with respect to the social cost, fopt(x) = arg min
y
n∑
i=1
cost(y, xi),
is not strategyproof.
Proof. Consider an instance x = 〈x1, x2, x3〉, such that x2 + b < x3 − b, x2 − b < x1 + b < x2 and
(x1 + b) − (x2 − b) = , where  is an arbitrarily small positive quantity. On this instance, the
optimal facility location is x2 + b and the cost of agent x1 is c+ 2b− . Suppose now that agent x1
reports x′1 < x2− 2b. Moreover, suppose that when there are two locations y1 and y2, with y1 < y2
that admit the same social cost, the optimal mechanism outputs y1. If the mechanism outputs y2
instead, we can use a symmetric argument on the instance x′ = 〈x′1, x′2, x′3〉 = 〈x′1, x2, x2 + 2b− 〉
with agent 3 misreporting x3.
4 By this tie-breaking rule, on instance x = 〈x′1, x2, x3〉, the location
of the facility is x2− b and the cost of agent x1 is c+ , i.e. smaller than before. Hence, the optimal
mechanism is not strategyproof. To extend this to an arbitrary number of agents, let xj = x2 for
every other agent xj . 
4In fact, even if the optimal mechanism outputs a distribution over points that all admit the minimum social cost,
the argument still works.
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Figure 3: Cases of Theorem 9. The dotted lines indicate the position of agent xi before moving
her from the left side to the right side of y. The cost of every agent with respect to y is the same
before and after moving her to the right. The figure depicts only three agents (including x1 and
xn).
Unfortunately, when considering the social cost, in the extremal case, the approximation ratio
of Mechanism M2 is dependent on the number of agents. The approximation ratio is given by the
following theorem.
Theorem 9. For n > 3 agents, Mechanism M2 achieves an approximation ratio of Θ(n) for the
social cost.
Proof. Consider any instance x′ = 〈x′1, ..., x′n〉 and let y = fopt(x′). It also holds that fM2(x′) =
x′1 − b. Denote the social costs of the optimal mechanism and Mechanism M2 on instance x′ by
SCopt(x
′) and SCM2(x′), respectively. Let x be the instance obtained by instance x′ as follows. For
every agent i, i 6= 1, if x′i+b ≤ y, let xi = 2y−x′i; if x′i < y < x′i+b, let xi = x′i+2b; if x′i−b < y < x′i,
let xi = 2y−x′i+2b; otherwise let xi = x′i. Observe that |xi−b−y| = min (|x′i − b− y|, |x′i + b− y|)
and hence cost(xi, y) = cost(x
′
i, y) for every agent i. Similarily, it holds that (xi − b)− (x1 − b) ≥
(x′i− b)− (x′1− b) and hence (since x1 = x′1), cost(xi− b, x1− b) ≥ cost(x′i− b, x′1− b) for all agents
i.
We will calculate an upper bound on the approximation ratio on instance x′. To do that,
we will calculate an upper bound on the value of the ratio SCM2(x)/SCy(x) on instance x,
where SCM2(x) is the social cost of Mechanism M2 on instance x and SCy(x) is the social
cost admitted by y on instance x. By the way the instance was constructed, it holds that
SCM2(x) ≥ SCM2(x′) and SCy(x) = SCy(x′) = SCopt(x′) and hence SCM2(x)/SCy(x) is an
upper bound on SCM2(x
′)/SCopt(x′).
Let di = (xi − b) − y, for i = 2, ..., n and let k =
∑
i 6=1 di. Finally let d = |y − (x1 + b)|. We
consider three cases. (See Figure 3).
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Case 1: x1 + b < y.
In this case, the social cost admitted by y is SCy(x) = nc+k+d, and the cost of Mechanism M2
is SCM2(x) = nc+ k + (n− 1)(d+ 2b). The ratio is
SCM2(x)
SCy(x)
= g(k, d, n) =
k + (n− 1)(d+ 2b) + nc
k + d+ nc
.
By calculating the partial derivative of the ratio with respect to k, we have
∂g(k, d, n)
∂k
=
k + d+ nc− k − (n− 1)(d+ 2b)− nc
(k + d+ nc)2
=
d− (n− 1)(d+ 2b)
(k + d+ nc)2
< 0.
When k = 0, i.e. xi = y + b for all agents i = 2, . . . , n, the ratio achieves the maximum value with
respect to k. We plug in k = 0 to the above formula and get
SCM2(x)
SCy(x)
= g(d, n) =
(n− 1)(d+ 2b) + nc
d+ nc
=
(n− 1)d+ 2(n− 1)b+ nc
d+ nc
.
Again, we calculate the partial derivative of g(d, n) with respect to d,
∂g(d, n)
∂d
=
(n− 1)(d+ nc)− (n− 1)d− 2(n− 1)b− nc
(d+ nc)2
=
c(n2 − 4n+ 2)
(d+ nc)2
.
For sufficiently large n (n ≥ 2b/c), the above value is positive, so the ratio is maximized when d
approaches to infinity, which means that agent x1 is positioned very far away from the rest of the
agents coinciding on position xi. Therefore the ratio goes to n− 1.
Case 2: x1 < y ≤ x1 + b, which means 0 ≤ d < b.
In this case, the social cost admitted by y is SCy(x) = k+d+nc, and the cost of Mechanism M2
is SCM2(x) = k + (n− 1)(2b− d) + nc. So the ratio is
SCM2(x)
SCy(x)
= g(k, d, n) =
k + (n− 1)(2b− d) + nc
k + d+ nc
.
Again, we calculate the partial derivative of g(k, d, n) with respect to k,
∂g(k, d, n)
∂k
=
k + d+ nc− k − (n− 1)(2b− d)− nc
(k + d+ nc)2
=
d− (n− 1)(2b− d)
(k + d+ nc)2
.
Since 0 ≤ d < b, d < 2b − d and the above value is negative. To get the maximum value of the
ratio, we plug in k = 0 and the approximation ratio becomes
SCM2(x)
SCy(x)
= g(d, n) =
(n− 1)(2b− d) + nc
d+ nc
.
By calculating the partial derivative with respect to d, we get
∂g(d, n)
∂d
=
−(n− 1)(d+ nc)− (n− 1)(2b− d)− nc
(d+ nc)2
=
−(n− 2)nc− (n− 1)2b
(d+ nc)2
< 0.
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So the ratio is maximized when d = 0, and the ratio is 1 + (2n−2)b+ncnc , which (for sufficiently large
n) is smaller than the ratio in Case 1.
Case 3: x1 − b < y ≤ x1, which means b ≤ d < 2b.
In this case, the social cost admitted by y is SCy(x) = k+2b−d+nc, and cost of Mechanism M2
is SCM2(x) = k + (n− 1)(2b− d) + nc. So the ratio is
SCM2(x)
SCy(x)
= g(k, d, n) =
k + (n− 1)(2b− d) + nc
k + 2b− d+ nc .
We first calculate partial derivative of the function g with respect to k,
∂g(k, d, n)
∂k
=
k + 2b− d+ nc− k − (n− 1)(2b− d)− nc
(k + 2b− d+ nc)2 =
(2− n)(2b− d)
(k + 2b− d+ nc)2 < 0.
The function is decreasing in k so let’s set k = 0. The function f becomes
SCM2(x)
SCy(x)
= g(d, n) =
(n− 1)(2b− d) + nc
2b− d+ nc .
Now, we calculate partial derivative of g with respect to d and get
∂g(d, n)
∂d
=
−(n− 1)(2b− d)− n(n− 1)c+ (n− 1)(2b− d) + nc
(2b− d+ nc)2 ≤ 0.
So function g(d, n) is decreasing in d. Let’s set d = b, and the ratio goes to (n−1)b+ncb+nc , which goes
to n− 1 as well.
In all, since SCM2(x)/SCy(x) ≤ n−1 the approximation ratio of Mechanism M2 is at most n−1.
The approximation ratio is exactly n − 1 on any instance x = 〈x1, x2, ..., xn〉 with x2 = · · · = xn
and x1  x2, i.e. when agent 1 lies on the left, really far away from the other n− 1 agents. 
Next, we will prove a lower bound of 1 + b/c on the approximation ratio of any anonymous,
position invariant, and strategyproof mechanism, when the number of agents is even. We will start
with the following lemma.
Lemma 8. Let Mn be a strategyproof, anonymous and position invariant mechanism for n agents,
where n is even. Then, for any location profile x = 〈x1 = . . . = xn/2, xn/2+1 = . . . = xn〉, it holds
that Mn(x) = x1 − b.
Proof. Let M2 be the following mechanism for two agents: On input location profile 〈x1, x2〉, output
Mn(x′), where x′ = 〈x′1 = · · · = x′n/2, x′n/2+1 = . . . = x′n〉, and x′1 = x1 and x′n/2+1 = x2. First, we
claim that M2 is strategyproof, anonymous and position invariant. If that is true, then by Theorem
7, M2 is Mechanism M2 and the lemma follows.
First let x = 〈x1, x2〉, xˆ = 〈xˆ1, xˆ2〉 be any two position equivalent location profiles. Observe
that the corresponding n-agent profiles x′ and xˆ′ obtained by placing n/2 agents on x1 and xˆ1 and
n/2 agents on x2 and xˆ2 respectively are also position equivalent. Since M
n is position invariant,
it must hold that Mn(x′) = Mn(xˆ′) and hence by construction of M2, M2(x) = M2(xˆ). Since x
and xˆ where arbitrary, Mechanism M2 is position invariant.
19
Similarly, let x = 〈x1, x2〉, xˆ = 〈xˆ1, xˆ2〉 be any two location profiles, such that xˆ is obtained by x
by a permutation of the agents. The outcome of Mn on the corresponding n-agent location profiles
(since the number of agents placed on x1 and x2 is the same) is the same and by construction of
M2, M2(x) = M2(xˆ) and since the profiles where arbitrary, the mechanism is anonymous.
Finally, for strategyproofness, start with a location profile xˆ′ = 〈xˆ′1, xˆ′2〉 and let x′ = 〈x′1 =
· · · = x′n/2, x′n/2+1 = . . . = x′n〉 be the corresponding n-agent location profile. Let y = Mn(x′) and
let cost(x′, y) be the cost of agents x′1, . . . , x′n/2 on x
′. For any x1, let 〈x1, x′2 = . . . = x′n/2, x′n/2+1 =
. . . = x′n〉 be the resulting location profile. By strategyproofness of Mn, agent x′1 can not decrease
her cost by misreporting x1 on profile x
′ and hence her cost on the new profile is at least cost(x′, y).
Next, consider the location profile 〈x1 = x2, x′3 = . . . = x′n/2, x′n/2+1 = . . . = x′n〉 and observe that
by the same argument, the cost of agent x′2 is not smaller on the new profile when compared to
〈x1, x′2 = . . . = x′n/2, x′n/2+1 = . . . = x′n〉 and hence her cost is at least cost(x′, y). Continuing like
this, we obtain the profile 〈x1 = . . . = xn/2, x′n/2+1 = . . . = x′n〉 and by the same argument, the cost
of agent x′n/2 on this profile is at least cost(x
′, y). The location profile 〈x1 = . . . = xn/2, x′n/2+1 =
. . . = x′n〉 corresponds to the 2-agent location profile xˆ = 〈xˆ1, xˆ′2〉 and by construction of M2,
cost(xˆ′1,M2(xˆ′)) ≤ cost(xˆ′1,M2(xˆ)) and since the choice of x1 (and hence the choice of xˆ1) was
arbitrary, Mechanism M2 is strategyproof.
Theorem 10. When the number of agents is even, any strategyproof mechanism that satisfies
position invariance and anonymity achieves an approximation ratio of at least 1 + (b/c) for the
social cost.
Proof. Let Mn be a strategyproof, anonymous and position invariant mechanism and consider any
location profile x = 〈x1 = . . . = xn/2, xn/2 + 1 = . . . = xn with xn/2+1 = x1 + 2b. By Lemma
8, Mn(x) = x1 − b and the social cost of Mn is nc + (n/2)2b while the social cost of the optimal
allocation is only nc. The lower bound follows.
4.4 Maximum Cost
First, it is easy to see that the mechanism that outputs the location that minimizes the maximum
cost is not strategyproof. On any instance 〈x1, x2〉 with x1 + b < x2− b the optimal location of the
facility is (x1 + x2)/2. If agent x2 misreports x
′
2 = 2x2− 2b− x1 then the location moves to x2− b,
minimizing her cost.
While the approximation ratio of Mechanism M2 for the social cost is not constant, for the
maximum cost that is indeed the case. In fact, as we will prove, when the number of agents is
even, Mechanism M2 actually achieves the best possible approximation ratio amongst strategyproof
mechanisms. We start with the theorem about the approximation ratio of Mechanism M2.
Theorem 11. For n ≥ 3, Mechanism M2 achieves an approximation ratio of 1 + 2bc for the
maximum cost.
Proof. Let x = 〈x1, ..., xn〉 be any instance. We consider three cases, depending on the distance
between agents x1 and xn.
Case 1: x1 + b ≤ xn − b⇒ xn − x1 ≥ 2b.
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In this case, the cost of the optimal mechanism is MCopt(x) = (xn−b)− x1+xn2 +c = xn−x12 −b+c,
whereas the cost of Mechanism M2 is MCM2(x) = xn − x1 + c. The approximation ratio is
MCM2(x)
MCopt(x)
=
2(xn − x1 + c)
xn − x1 − 2b+ 2c = 2 +
4b− 2c
xn − x1 − 2b+ 2c ≤ 1 +
2b
c
.
Hence, in this case, the approximation ratio is at most 1 + 2bc . For xn − b = x1 + b (the instance
on which the right peak of the first agent and the left peak of the last agent coincide), the approx-
imation ratio is exactly 1 + 2bc .
Case 2: x1 < xn − b < x1 + b⇒ c < xn − x1 < 2b.
The cost of Mechanism M2 in this case is MCM2(x) = xn− b− (x1− b) + c = xn−x1 + c, while
the cost of the optimal mechanism is at least c. The approximation ratio is
MCM2(x)
MCopt(x)
≤ (xn − x1 + c)
c
< 1 +
2b
c
Case 3: x1 − b ≤ xn − b ≤ x1 ⇒ xn − x1 ≤ b.
The cost of Mechanism M2 is MCM2(x) = xn−x1 + c while the cost of the optimal mechanism
is at least c. The approximation ratio is
MCM2(x)
MCopt(x)
≤ (xn − x1 + c)
c
≤ 1 + b
c
.
Over the three cases, the worst approximation ratio is at most 1 + 2bc and there is actually an
instance of the problem with approximation ratio exactly 1 + 2bc , ensuring that the bound is tight.

The lower bound for the case when the number of agents is even follows.
Corollary 1. When the number of agents is even, any deterministic strategyproof mechanism that
satisfies position invariance and anonymity achieves an approximation ratio of at least 1 + 2bc for
the maximum cost.
Proof. On instance xˆ of the proof of Theorem 10, there are agents whose cost for any strategyproof,
anonymous and position invariant mechanism is 2b + c, while under the optimal mechanism it is
only c. The lower bound on the approximation ratio follows.
A worse lower bound that holds for any number of agents (and without using the position
invariance property) is proved in the next theorem.
Theorem 12. Any deterministic strategyproof mechanism achieves an approximation ratio of at
least 2 for the maximum cost.
Proof. Consider an instance x = 〈x1, x2〉 with x1 + b < x2 − b (the instance can be extended to
arbitrarily many agents by placing agents on positions x1 and x2 and all the arguments will still
hold). The optimal location of the facility is fopt(x) =
x1+x2
2 . Assume for contradiction that M is
a deterministic strategyproof mechanism with approximation ratio smaller than 2.
First, we argue that it can not be that fM(x) ∈ [x2 − b,∞). Let d = x2 − b− fopt(x). It holds
that MCopt(x) = c + d. If it was fM(x) ∈ [x2 − b,∞), then it would be that MCM(x) ≥ c + 2d
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Table 2: The results for the case when peaks are not required to be symmetric.
Non-symmetric
Ratio Lower
Social cost
Deterministic Θ(n) 1 + b1+b2c
Randomized Θ(n) -
Maximum cost
Deterministic Θ(n) 1 + b1+b2c
Randomized Θ(n) 3/2
and the approximation ratio would be at least 2 − cd+c which goes to 2 as d grows to infinity
(i.e. the agents are placed very far away from each other). Now, for Mechanism M to achieve
an approximation ratio smaller than 2, it must be fM(x) ∈ [fopt(x), x2 − b) (or symmetrically
fM(x) ∈ (x1 + b, fopt(x)]).
Now consider the instance x′ = 〈x′1, x′2〉 with x′1 = x1 and x′2 = fM(x) + b. On this instance,
it must be either fM(x
′) = fM(x) or fM(x′) = fM(x) + 2b (the left or the right peak of agent x′2),
otherwise agent x′2 could report x2 and move the facility to x′2−b, minimizing her cost and violating
strategyproofness. For calculating the lower bound, we need the choice that admits the smaller of
the two costs, i.e. fM(x
′) = fM(x). We calculate the approximation ratio on instance x′.
The optimal choice for the facility is again fopt(x
′) = (x1 + x′2)/2. Let λ = (x′2 − b)− fopt(x′).
The approximation ratio then is 2 − cλ+c . We know that λ ≥ d/2, so when d grows to infinity as
before, λ also grows to infinity and the approximation ratio goes to 2. This means that there exists
an instance for which the approximation ratio of the mechanism is 2, which gives us the lower
bound.
5 Generalizations and conclusion
As argued in the introduction, double-peaked preferences are often a very realistic model for fa-
cility location and our results initiate the discussion on such settings and shed some light on the
capabilities and limitations of strategyproof mechanisms. We conclude with a discussion about an
extension to the main model and some potential future directions.
5.1 Non-symmetric peaks
Although the symmetric case is arguably the best analogue of the single-peaked preference setting,
it could certainly make sense to consider a more general model, where the cost functions do not
have the same slope in every interval and hence the peaks are not equidistant from the location of
an agent. Let b1 and b2 be the distances from the left and the right peaks respectively. Clearly, all
our lower bounds still hold, although one could potentially prove even stronger bounds by taking
advantage of the more general setting. The main observation is that Mechanism M1 is no longer
truthful-in-expectation, because its truthfulness depends heavily on the peaks being equidistant.
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On the other hand, mechanism M2 is still strategyproof and the approximation ratio bounds extend
naturally. A summary of the results for the non-symmetric setting is depicted in Table 2.
5.2 Future work
Starting from randomized mechanisms, we would like to obtain lower bounds that are functions of b
and c, to see how well Mechanism M1 fares in the general setting. For deterministic mechanisms, we
would like to get a result that would clear up the picture. Characterizing strategyproof, anonymous
and position invariant mechanisms would be ideal, but proving a lower bound that depends on n
on the ratio of such mechanisms (for the social cost) would also be quite helpful. The techniques
used in our characterization for two agents and our lower bounds (available at the full version)
seem to convey promising intuition for achieving such a task. Finally, it would be interesting to see
if we can come up with a “good” randomized truthful-in-expectation mechanism for the extended
model, when peaks are not assumed to be symmetric.
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